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CONTRACTS, BILLS AND NOTES, AND SALES
C. THOMAS WYCHE*
I. CONTRACTS
Alderman v. Bivin' involved the validity of a release and
whether it was rescindable because of a mistake as to the ex-
tent of the actual injuries sustained. The plaintiff sustained
damages to the engine of his truck due to a severe freeze; the
defendants had been negligent in failing to put anti-freeze in
the truck. Upon inspection by a repairman selected by plain-
tiff it appeared that only a gasket had been blown out. The de-
fendants, through their liability insurer, paid the amount
($30.00) to repair this damage and plaintiff executed a gen-
eral release to defendants. It later developed that the engine
block was cracked and useless and plaintiff sought to set aside
the release on the ground of mutual mistake.
The Court upheld the decision of the lower court which de-
cided from the allegations of the complaint that the mistake
was unilateral rather than mutual. The mistake resulted from
the failure of plaintiff's agent to discover the extent of dam-
age and was plaintiff's mistake rather than both parties'.
TurbeviUe v. Gordon2 primarily involved the interpretation
of a complaint to which defendant demurred; so the case is
of more interest from a procedural than substantive stand-
point. As interpreted, the complaint alleges that the defendant
impliedly promised to pay plaintiff for constructing a house
on defendant's lot to be occupied by defendant's daughter and
son-in-law. Upon trial defendant's liability may well rest on
an estoppel theory rather than contract, actual or implied. To
hold that the complaint alleges an implied contract does in-
deed require a liberal construction of the complaint, but hav-
ing reached such a conclusion, from the substantive stand-
point, the correct result is reached.
*Member of the firm of Wyche, Burgess & Wyche, Greenville, S. C.
B.E., 1946, Yale University; LL.B., 194a, University of Virginia; mem-
ber of Greenville County, South Carolina, and American Bar Associa-
tions.
1. 233 S. C. 545, 106 S. E. 2d 385 (1958).
2. 233 S. C. 75, 103 S. E. 2d 521 (1958).
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Furbeck v. Crest Manufacturing Company3 presented the
single legal question as to whether a written contract of em-
ployment was invalid as being for an indefinite period of
time. The letter agreement was in essence as follows:
... we must have your cooperation in accepting this offer
to join our sales force.... We would have you work New
York State and New England until about October 1st, and
then the Southeastern states until April 1st.
The proposal was accepted by plaintiff but the following
month the employment was terminated. The Court sustained
the directed verdict in favor of the employee holding that the
contract of employment was for a definite period of time.
In Delmar Studios v. Kinsey,4 the defendant in his employ-
ment contract with plaintiff had agreed not to compete with
plaintiff in soliciting, procuring or carrying out certain types
of contracts involving photography. The period of the restric-
tion was two years following termination of employment. The
restricted area was about three-fourths of North Carolina,
all of South Carolina, and eleven counties in Georgia. This
comprised the entire area in which plaintiff did business. De-
fendant ceased his employment relation and began the prohi-
bited solicitation in portions of South Carolina and Georgia.
The interpretation of this contract was governed by North
Carolina law. After a review of the North Carolina decisions
the Court concluded that the non-competition restriction was
unenforceable since the plaintiff had not shown that the ex-
tent of the territory included was necessary for the protection
of plaintiff's business. The testimony showed that defend-
ant's contact with plaintiff's customers was within a limited
area. The Court further held that the contract could not be re-
vised by making a new territory limitation which would be
reasonable and that the entire contract must fall.
In Somerset v. Reyner,5 a similar non-competition agree-
ment was involved except that in this case the agreement was
in connection with the sale of a business rather than an em-
ployment contract.
3. 233 S. C. 169, 103 S. E. 2d 920 (1956).
4. 233 S. 0. 313, 104 S. E. 2d 338 (1958).
5. 233 S. C. 324, 104 S. E. 2d 344 (1958).
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The plaintiff sold his jewelry business to defendant and
agreed not to compete for a period of twenty (20) years any-
where in South Carolina. The business which was purchased
had 95 per cent of its sales from within the greater Columbia
area.
The Court concluded that there was no basis for the extent
of the territorial restraint and that the covenant was clearly
invalid.
The Court then considered whether it should enforce so
much of the restriction as would be reasonable from a stand-
point of duration and territory. Without deciding specifically
whether such a holding might not follow in some cases, the
Court held that in this particular case it could not undertake to
split up the covenant and carve out a new territory; it was the
intent of the parties that the contract be indivisible and the
whole contract must fall.
The plaintiff in Pharr v. Canal Insurance Company had
previously obtained a judgment for damages against a person
who was insured under a liability policy of defendant. The de-
fendant had, in another action, obtained a declaratory judg-
ment against its insured to the effect that defendant was not
liable under said policy because of the acts of the insured in
failing to cooperate as required by the terms of the policy;
the plaintiff was not made a party to the declaratory judg-
ment suit. The judgment was offered as a defense to the in-
stant suit. The lower court directed a verdict for the plaintiff
and this appeal followed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the
declaratory judgment suit between the insurer and the insured
was not binding on the plaintiff who was injured by the neg-
ligence of the insured. This was because the third party who
was injured was not a party to the declaratory judgment suit
and, therefore, the identity of parties necessary to res adjudi-
cata was missing. The Court also held that under the terms of
the insurance policy the injured person who had obtained his
judgment could maintain an action directly against the in-
surer.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the finding of the lower
court, however, that the judgment holder was entitled to a
directed verdict against the insurer and said that the trial
judge should have submitted to the jury whether the insured
6. 233 S. 0. 266, 104 S. E. 2d 394 (1958).
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had complied with the terms of his policy and cooperated with
the insurer. The testimony showed that the insured failed to
meet with the attorneys of the insurer, failed to acknowledge
correspondence or comply with certain requests of such attor-
neys; thereafter, the insurer withdrew from the defense of
the action and the plaintiff thereafter obtained judgment. Al-
though the burden of proof is upon the insurer to show that
the insured has failed to perform the terms and conditions
and, in addition, that the insurer was substantially prejudiced
by the failure to cooperate, the facts in this case raise for the
jury's decision whether the insured has proven this defense.
The plaintiff in Evatt v. Campbell7 was engaged in part-
nership with the defendant under a written partnership
agreement but brought this action for alleged salaries that
had been unpaid to plaintiff, claiming that the previous part-
nership agreement had been superseded by an oral contract of
employment. The written partnership agreement did not have
any provisions as to how it should be modified or any require-
ment that its modification or termination be in writing. The
Court held that a written agreement could be modified or
superseded by an oral one if supported by valuable considera-
tion. The referee's findings of fact, concurred in by the Cir-
cuit Judge, were to the effect that such written agreement
had been superseded by an oral contract of employment; these
findings were supported by competent evidence and, there-
fore, were binding on the Supreme Court. Also presented in
the case was the question of accounting by the partnership.
The special referee accepted the accounting submitted by the
plaintiff and this finding was concurred in by the lower
court. The Supreme Court concluded that the facts amply sup-
port the findings of the special referee insofar as the account-
ing was concerned.
The plaintiff in Batchelor v. American Health Insurance
Company" brought a suit under a "Hospital Expense Policy",
claiming benefits payable under the terms of the policy. The
issuance of the policy and the amount of medical bills incur-
red by the plaintiff were admitted but the defense was that
the plaintiff had taken out numerous hospitalization policies
which voided the particular policy because the overall scheme
was one of wagering. It was shown by the evidence that the
7. 234 S. C. 1, 106 S. E. 2d 447 (1959).
8. 234 S. C. 103, 107 S. E. 2d 36 (1959).
1959]
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amount that could be recovered under the various contracts
of insurance was highly disproportionate to any loss which
could be sustained. The trial court directed a verdict in favor
of the insurance company on the ground that such policies
were wagering contracts. This decision was reversed; the Su-
preme Court held that there is no established public policy
which prevents one from purchasing as many hospital ex-
pense policies as one may desire. There is no statute or judi-
cial decisions establishing a public policy which prevents such
action. The Court pointed out that an insurer could, under the
insurance laws of this state, provide for a proportionate re-
duction of insurance in its policy in the event the insured had
other similar insurance with other companies. This clause was
not contained in the policy under question and, therefore,
plaintiff was entitled to full recovery.
II. SALES
In Mishoe v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,9 the
defendant had repossessed plaintiff's automobile pursuant to
a conditional sales contract or chattel mortgage. The automo-
bile was sold at public sale after notice by registered mail was
given to the plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter brought an action
against the defendant for alleged fraud and deceit, apparent-
ly in inducing the plaintiff to go to Tabor City, North Caro-
lina, with his automobile where it was seized or repossessed
by the defendant.
The lower court construed the conditional sales contract as
giving the plaintiff a thirty-day grace period after default.
The defendant had, after default, declared the entire balance
due under the contract but the plaintiff thereafter tendered
to the defendant the monthly payment, contending that such
payment could be made within the thirty-day period.
The Court, after examining the contract in some detail, con-
cluded that the clause which made reference to installments
not paid within thirty days related to the amount that would
be required to restore a defaulted contract to a current status
should the holder of the conditional sales contract not elect
to declare the entire indebtedness due and payable. The other
provision of the contract clearly gave the holder thereof the
unqualified right to declare the whole amount due and payable
9. 234 S. C. 182, 107 S. E. 2d 43 (1958).
[Vo] 12
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upon default without having to wait for any period of time to
pass. Therefore, it was held as a matter of law that the maker
of the contract was in default as a matter of law and that the
judge should have so charged the jury.
The. Court then discussed the question of whether the plain-
tiff had made out a case as to the action for fraud and deceit.
The Court held that under the facts viewed most favorably
from the standpoint of the plaintiff there was not a false rep-
resentation, but that the holder of the conditional sales con-
tract had the right to repossess the automobile under its con-
tract and that the plaintiff sustained no loss on account of any
misrepresentation by the defendant.
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